HISTORY PAPER 1 GRADE 12 ADDENDUM - 2018 SEPTEMBER PREPARATORY EXAM PAPERS AND MEMOS
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GRADE 12
NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE
ADDENDUM
SEPTEMBER 2018
SECTION A: SOURCE-BASED QUESTIONS
QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS INTENSIFY COLD WAR TENSIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE 1960s?
SOURCE 1A
The extract below explains Cuba’s involvement with the Soviet Union and the United States of America’s attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government.
| It was after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, that Fidel Castro forged strong economic links with the Soviet Union, with whom, at the time, the United States was engaged in the Cold War. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was very concerned at the direction Castro’s government was taking, and in March 1960, he allocated $13,1 million to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to plan Castro’s overthrow (though the plan to overthrow Castro was put off for Kennedy to decide). The Central Intelligence Agency proceeded to organise the operation with the aid of various Cuban counter-revolutionary forces, training Brigade 2506 in Guatemala. Eisenhower’s successor John F. Kennedy approved the final invasion plan in April 1961. Over 1 400 paramilitaries, divided into five infantry battalions and one paratrooper battalion, assembled in Guatemala before setting out for Cuba by boat on 13 April 1961. Two days later, on 15 April, eight Central Intelligence Agency-supplied B-26 bombers attacked Cuban airfields and then returned to the US. On the night of 16 April, the main invasion landed at a beach named Playa Giron in the Bay of Pigs. It initially overwhelmed (overcame) a local revolutionary militia. The Cuban Army’s counter-offensive was led by Jose Ramon Fernandez, before Castro decided to take personal control of the operation. As the US involvement became apparent to the world, Kennedy decided against providing further air cover for the invasion. As a result, the operation only had half the forces the CIA had deemed necessary. The original plan devised during Eisenhower’s presidency had required both air and naval support. On 20 April, the invaders surrendered after only three days, with the majority being publicly interrogated and put into Cuban prisons. |
SOURCE 1B
This source focuses on the deployment of missiles to Cuba by the Soviet Union and how the United States of America discovered these missile sites.
| After the failed attempt to overthrow Castro’s regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter (stop) any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but US intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, including Soviet IL-28 bombers, during routine surveillance fights, and on 4 September 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the construction of offensive weapons in Cuba. Despite the warning, on 14 October a US U-2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating (causing) the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy summoned his closest advisors to consider the options and a direct course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisors – including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff – argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a US invasion of Cuba; others favoured stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On 22 October, he ordered a naval ‘quarantine’ of Cuba. |
SOURCE 1C
The source below shows the United States of America’s blockade of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy announced a ‘quarantine zone’ around Cuba.
SOURCE 1D
The following source is a letter from President Khrushchev to President Kennedy written on 26 October 1962. He states the Soviet Union’s commitment towards world peace.
| I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and still more, communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the people. We, Communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity (disaster), and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labour. War is our enemy and a calamity (disaster) for all the peoples. It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with US, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples. I see, Mr President, that you too are not devoid (lacking) of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. |
QUESTION 2:
HOW DID THE ATTEMPTS BY THE ANGOLAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS FAIL TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IN ANGOLA IN 1975?
SOURCE 2A
This extract is from the book The State of Africa by M Meredith. It explains the state of Angola’s liberation movements when the Portuguese left Angola in 1975.
| In Angola, the transition from Portuguese rule turned into a major disaster. As the Portuguese administration there disintegrated (broke down), three rival nationalist factions competed for power, transforming a colonial war into a civil war … All three nationalist factions were weak and disorganised. They made no serious effort to reach a negotiated settlement, but instead tried to gain advantage by appealing for support from foreign interests. It was because of their incessant rivalry that foreign involvement in Angola acquired such a crucial importance. … the strongest faction in military terms was Holden Roberto’s FNLA. The difficulty facing the FNLA was that its field of operations was confined to northern Angola and its following came from the Bakongo. The position of Agostinho Neto’s MPLA in April 1974 was precarious (risky). It had fragmented into three rival groups; guerrilla activity was at standstill … The party was firmly rooted … in Kimbundu areas lying east of Luanda. Nevertheless, the MPLA remained essentially a regional party. Neither in the north among the Bakongo nor in the south among the Ovimbundu did it acquire much of a following. The third faction, UNITA – had been launched in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, one of Holden Roberto’s former associates. It had attracted a following among the Ovimbundu, Angola’s largest tribe, concentrated in the central highland districts of Huambo and Bie. Unita consisted of a force of no more than about 1000 poorly armed men operating in a small base area in the central highlands. |
SOURCE 2B
The extract below from the book The Silent War by P Stiff explains why the Alvor Accord, signed on 15 January 1975, failed to bring peace in Angola.
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| After months of negotiations and pressure by the OAU (Organisation of African Unity), the Portuguese and the three movements signed the ‘Alvor Accord’ at Alvor in Portugal on 15 January 1975. It allowed for elections for a constituent assembly to be held in October 1975, until which time power would be vested (given to) in a transitional (period of change) government headed by a Portuguese High Commissioner. The Portuguese and the three parties would each hold three ministerial posts, while the premiership would rotate amongst the parties. Independence would follow on 11 November 1975. It allowed for the formation of an Angolan Defence Force, to which each movement would contribute 8 000 troops and the Portuguese 24 000. Portuguese soldiers in excess of that number would be returned to Portugal by 30 April 1975. The transitional government was duly inaugurated on 31 January 1975, but it was doomed to failure. The main ingredients required to make it work were Roberto, Savimbi and Neto, but they were too busy consolidating their respective political positions for the October elections to bother with it. The three liberation movements had bluffed (lied) at Alvor. Neither Neto nor Savimbi possessed the capability of honouring their commitments to each contribute 8 000 troops to the new Angolan Defence Force. Put simply, they lacked the manpower. Roberto had the men, but he was too busy in the northwest to bother. … So the new Angolan Defence Force was a non-starter and the chaos worsened. |
SOURCE 2C
The photograph below shows leaders of the Angolan liberation movements meeting for the Nakuru Agreement on 21 June 1975 in Kenya. It was an attempt to salvage the Alvor Agreement.
SOURCE 2D
In the extract below Piero Gleijeses, a professor in foreign policies, explains how armed conflict started in Luanda in 1975.
| In fact, the war could not be postponed. The first clashes were in Luanda, just weeks after the transitional government took power. With over 550 000 residents, Luanda was the prize (benefit): the economic, political, and demographic capital of the country. A large majority of blacks and mulattoes (people of mixed race) – who together composed about 75% of the city’s population – supported the MPLA, but in those first months of 1975 the FNLA was, militarily, the dominant liberation movement in the city. ‘Its well-armed troops in their impeccable (perfect) uniforms’ had begun arriving in Luanda in October 1974 aboard planes of the Zairean air force. The FNLA was hoping to compensate (pay) for its lack of political appeal with military muscle, but the brutality and arrogance of its soldiers increased the population’s hostility. Distracted by its internal strife, the MPLA had sent troops to Luanda later and in far smaller numbers, and UNITA, which had almost no troops, had only a symbolic military presence in the capital. Chipenda, Neto’s defeated rival for the MPLA’s leadership, sent a group of armed men to Luanda to establish a military presence there, even though the Alvor Agreement recognized the FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA ‘as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola’. After losing the struggle for control of the MPLA, he had cast his lot with Mobutu and Roberto. |
QUESTION 3:
HOW DID AFRICAN AMERICAN LEADERS CONTRIBUTE TO THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE 1960s?
SOURCE 3A
This source explains the reasons that led to the emergence of the Black Power Movement in the United States of America in the 1960s.
| Finally, in 1964, the U.S. Congress passed a Civil Rights Act and in 1965, a Voting Rights Act. The Civil Rights Movement, and the new laws that were passed as a result, led to progress in gaining equality for black Americans. But not all African Americans were impressed with the Civil Rights Movement. In reality, prejudice (preconceived opinion) still existed. African Americans still experienced racial discrimination, lower wages than whites and higher crime rates in their inner city neighbourhoods. Many young African Americans in particular wanted to speed up real social change. They saw the Civil Rights Movement as too mainstream, and unable to give blacks the same opportunities as whites – socially, economically and politically … By the mid-1960s, dissatisfaction with the pace of change was growing, and the Black Power Movement arose out of this dissatisfaction. The Black Power Movement argued that in order to achieve genuine integration, blacks first had to unite in solidarity and become self-reliant. …The Black Power Movement was very broad, (and should perhaps be more accurately described as the Black Power Movements) and aimed to express a new racial consciousness among black people in the United States. The Movement had various meanings and interpretations. Significant aspects included the following: racial dignity and self-reliance. This meant freedom from white authority in both economics and politics. Stokely Carmichael summed up the Black Power philosophy with these words: ‘I’m not going to beg the white man for anything I deserve – I’m going to take it. We want black power.’ |
SOURCE 3B
The extract below is taken from a speech delivered by Malcolm X, titled ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’, on 12 April 1964 in Detroit Michigan. It explains the Black Power philosophy.
| The political philosophy of Black Nationalism only means that the black man should control the politics and the politicians in his own community … to carry on a political program of re-education to open our people’s eyes, make us become more politically conscious, politically mature, and then whenever we get ready to cast our ballot, that ballot will be cast for a man of the community who has the good of the community at heart. The economic philosophy of Black Nationalism only means that we should own, operate and control the economy of our community … This government has failed us; … the white liberals who have been posing as our friends have failed us … We need a self-help program, a do-it-yourself philosophy, a do-it-right-now philosophy, an it’s-already-too-late philosophy … Black Nationalism is a self-help philosophy … This is a philosophy that eliminates the necessity for division and argument ... As long as you got a sit-down philosophy, you’ll have a sit-down thought pattern, and as long as you think that old sit-down thought you’ll be in some kind of sit-down action ... It’s not so good to refer to what you’re going to do as a sit-in … An old woman can sit. An old man can sit … A coward can sit. Anything can sit. Well, you and I have been sitting long enough, and it’s time today for us to start doing some standing, and some fighting to back that up. … Join any kind of organisation, civic, religious, fraternal, political, or otherwise that’s based on lifting the black man up and making him master of his own community. It’ll be the ballot or it’ll be the bullet. It’ll be liberty or it’ll be death. And if you’re not ready to pay that price don’t use the word freedom in your vocabulary. |
SOURCE 3C
This photograph depicts armed members of the Black Panther Party, Robert Williams and his wife.
SOURCE 3D
The following extract outlines the Black Power Movement and its transformation. It was written by Lakisha Odlum of the New York City Department of Education.
| The Black Power Movement of the 1960s and 1970s was a political and social movement whose advocates believed in racial pride, self-sufficiency, and equality for all people of Black and African descent. Credited with first articulating ‘Black Power’ in 1966, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee leader, Stokely Carmichael, represented a generation of black activists who participated in both Civil Rights and the Black Power movements. By the mid-1960s, many of them no longer saw nonviolent protests as a viable means of combatting racism. New organisations, such as the Black Panther Party, the Black Women’s United Front, and the Nation of Islam, developed new cultural, political, and economic programs and grew memberships that reflected this shift. Desegregation was insufficient — only through the deconstruction of white power structures could a space be made for a black political voice to give rise to collective black power. Because of these beliefs, the movement is often represented as violent, anti-white, and anti-law enforcement. This primary source set addresses these representations through artefacts from the era, such as sermons, photographs, drawings, FBI investigations, and political manifestos. |
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:
Gleijeses, P. 2002. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (North Carolina University Press)
http://malcolmxfiles.blogspot.co.za/2013/06/the-ballot-or-bullet-april-12-1964.html/m=1
http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct26/doc4.html
http://writingcities.com/2017/06/29/negroes-with-guns-robert-f-williams-and-the-freedom-struggle/
https://dp.la/primary-source-sets/the-black-power-movement
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis
https://thisdayinusmilhist.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/page/23
https://v1.sahistory.org.za>classroom/grade12/3_1_3.htm
https://www.google.co.za/search?hl=en-ZA&source=android-browser-alamy.com
https://www.google.co.za/search?q=BLACK+POWER+MOVEMENT+SOURCES+IN+ USA
Meredith, M. 2005. The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (Simon & Schuster, UK)
Stiff, P. 1999. The Silent War, South African RECCE Operations 1969–1994 (Galagos, South Africa)
www.bbc.co.uk/education/guides/zygjq6f/revision/6