… The Black Consciousness message was simple, 'Black man, you are on your own.' We had nothing to beg from our oppressors. Biko even introduced a practical  disincentive (warning): 'Any black man who calls a white man "baas" is a non-white.' 
… No matter how painful it might be, it is a fact of history that the 16 June 1976 uprising occurred under the direct influence of the Black Consciousness Movement  (BCM), its ideology and its leadership. On 28 May 1976 the South African Students' Movement (SASM), a student component of the BCM, held its general students' council  meeting where the issue of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was discussed. The  minutes of the general students' council captured the spirit of the meeting and stated that the recent strikes by schools against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of  instruction is a sign of demonstration against systematised (organised) schools to  produce 'good industrial boys' for the powers that be … 'We resolve to totally reject the  use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction …' 
Seth Mazibuko gave this testimony at his 1977 trial: 'On 13 June 1976 I attended this  meeting. Various schools from Soweto were present. The main speaker explained to  us what the aims and objectives of SASM were. He also discussed the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and called upon the prefects of our schools to come forward  and to explain what the position was [in their schools]. I stood up and told the  congregation that the Phefeni [Junior Secondary] School refused to use Afrikaans and  they had boycotted classes during May 1976.' 
… Don [Tsietsi] Mashinini suggested that a mass demonstration should be held on  16 June 1976 by all black schools … The election for the new [Soweto region]  committee for SASM was then held. The following members were elected to the  committee: President, Don Mashinini of Morris Isaacson; Vice President, Seth Malibu;  myself, (Seth Mazibuko) Secretary; a female student [Sibongile Mkhabela] from Naledi  High School ...  

[From http://azapo.org.za/the-june-16-uprising-ushackled-a-black perspective/. Accessed on 05 May 2016.]

Earlier that day, Soweto schoolchildren had risen up against white authority and  marched through Vilakazi Street alongside Phefeni Junior Secondary School and  Orlando West High School in Soweto. The children had over the years witnessed the  creation of urban Bantu councils, tribal schools and ethnic school boards by the  country's white rulers and now Afrikaans was being imposed as a medium of  instruction in the teaching of Mathematics, History and Geography.  
As days and weeks passed without a response from the government, the South African  Student Movement (SASM) decided to hold a peaceful protest march in solidarity with  those pupils who were boycotting classes. Wednesday 16 June was chosen as D-day.  Chanting slogans and waving placards, some of which read 'Away with Afrikaans,' 
'Amandla Ngawethu' (Power to the People) and 'Free Azania' – the huge crowd had  attracted scores of people, including police … 
Five uniformed white police officers stood side by side in the middle of the road some  paces away, facing the sea of black faces. Behind them, more uniformed police, most  of them black and riot squad men, armed with rifles accompanied by dogs, alighted from (got out of) the police trucks. 
Suddenly one of the five officers stepped to the side, picking up what seemed to be a  stone. He hurled the object into the throng (crowd). Instantly the children in front of the  column scattered to the sides. They picked up stones and regrouped. They shouted  'Power, P-o-w-e-r!' as they advanced towards the police. And then the shooting began.  
… Afterwards everybody seemed terribly shaken. The bewildered (confused) pupils  then returned to the streets. Helped by motorists and journalists, they collected the  dead and the wounded, removing them from the scene. 
Mbuyisa Makhubu, a young activist, scooped (picked) up the pathetic body of Hector  Pieterson, the child who had died and set off down the road, howling (crying loudly) with grief with Pieterson's sister in anguish at his side. 

[From A People On The Boil by H Mashabela]

The next day (17 June 1976) the government closed down the schools and put the  South African military on alert. The Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs, Andries Treurnicht  (nicknamed 'Dr No'), announced: 'In the white areas of South Africa [including Soweto],  where the government erects the buildings, grants the subsidies and pays the  teachers, it is our right to decide on language policy.' 
The Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, accused the learners of being communists:  'Why do they walk with upraised fists? Surely this is the sign of the Communist Party?' And Prime Minister, John Vorster, announced: 'The government will not be intimidated  (threatened). Orders have been given to maintain order at all costs.' Those costs would  include the lives of 174 Africans and two whites who were killed that day, as well as  hundreds more who would be killed in the following months. News of the shootings  swept around the world and the South African economy began to feel the shock with  both gold and diamond shares dropping.  
Nevertheless, the South African government was prepared to deal with protests as it  always had, with extreme force and repression. The radicalisation (becoming  revolutionary) of the African youth was evident in the violence that began in Soweto.  Parents who had seen their children take to the streets, risking and sometimes losing  their lives, were stirred into action. Throughout the urban African townships parents  began to organise new political groups for the first time since the Defiance Campaign  of the 1950s. 

[From The Rise and Fall of Apartheid by LC Clark et al.]

… After the fall of apartheid, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was  instituted (established) as a way of bridging the divide (gap) between the oppressive  National Party and the democratic South Africa … 
The Simelane family filed her (Nokuthula's) case with the TRC in the hope of resolving  (deciding) her case. Five white men applied for amnesty relating to Nokuthula's  abduction, torture and disappearance, Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee, Anton  Pretorius, Frederick Mong, Frederick Williams and Jacobus Ross. At the TRC a former  commander of the Soweto Intelligence Unit (SIU), Willem 'Timol' Coetzee, the man  responsible for the disappearance and death of Nokuthula, stated that Nokuthula was  alive when he last saw her. The unit had turned her into a spy and redeployed (sent)  her back to Swaziland. 
Coetzee's argument was countered (opposed) by his colleague, Nimrod Veyi, who  confessed that she was tortured and brutally murdered and was buried around the  Rustenburg area. The TRC ruled against Coetzee's amnesty with regard to torture, but  he was granted amnesty for Nokuthula's abduction (kidnapping). The TRC further  awarded amnesty to the other four men (Pretorius, Mong, Williams and Ross) for  torturing her. Thus far, no one has come forth and taken responsibility for her  disappearance; neither the ANC nor former apartheid security forces have revealed  anything about her 'disappearance.' 
On 28 November 2009 a life-size statue of Nokuthula was erected and unveiled in  Bethal by the Mpumalanga government to honour her legacy and contribution towards  the liberation struggle. Furthermore, a documentary on the life and disappearance  of Simelane, entitled 'Betrayal', produced by Mark Kaplan, was televised on SABC 1 on  10 April 2006. 

[From www.sahistory.org.za/people/nokuthula-orela-simelane.  
Accessed on 15 February 2016.]

For Ernestina Simelane it's now or never. She hopes that a murder trial will reveal what  happened to her daughter, who disappeared 33 years ago on 26 February. She will  face the apartheid security branch policemen, Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee, Anton  Pretorius, Frederick Barnard Mong and Msebenzi Timothy 'Vastrap' Radebe – who  kidnapped Nokuthula Simelane and, the state believes, tortured and murdered the  23-year-old ANC courier. 
Mong, Pretorius and Coetzee applied to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for  amnesty for her kidnapping and torture, but not for Simelane's murder. Radebe did not  apply for amnesty. 
'I am alone. Afraid of dying like my husband, crying out for answers that had never  come,' said Simelane. On Monday the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)  announced that Simelane's alleged killers would stand trial for murder. Radebe will  also face kidnapping charges. 
… It was a cold June morning when Nokuthula Simelane telephoned her mother. 'She  called me to say she was safe in Swaziland and would return soon to collect her  graduation gown, dress and shoes. I told her not to, that there was trouble, that the  police were looking for her. They wanted to catch her to get information she had on the  ANC.'  
'… I am going to court to get answers. I want answers before they die, before they go  to their graves with their horrible secrets. I go to bed and dream … of Nokuthula calling  me for help. I want to see my baby's grave, to talk to her, to bring her home and bury  her with the dignity she deserves. If only someone can say something, just tell me  where she's buried. These men must tell me, so I can die peacefully.' 

[From The Times, 11 February 2016]

Meanwhile Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu has welcomed the NPA's decision to  prosecute Simelane's alleged killers. 
'I welcome the decision of the NPA to prosecute some of the suspects implicated in the  kidnapping, torture and murder of the young freedom fighter, Nokuthula Simelane, in  1983. It is a most significant and historic decision,' he said in a statement. 
Tutu, however, questioned the delay in prosecuting. 'What has taken them so long?  Why did the authorities turn their backs on the family of Nokuthula, and so many other  families, for so many years? Why did the pleas (requests) of her family fall on deaf  ears for decades? Why did it take a substantial application to the High Court to get the  National Director of Public Prosecutions and the police to do their jobs? Why did  successive South African governments take extraordinary steps to obstruct the course  of justice?' 
'… I understand that a police docket was opened in 1996 and that the amnesty  process in relation to the Simelane case was finalised in 2001. Recommendations on  more than 300 cases for prosecution, including this matter, were made to the NPA in  2002. Less than a handful of these cases had been pursued. The civil case brought by  the Simelane family in 2015 to compel the NPA to take action reveals that almost  immediately after the recommendations were made, the government took steps to  close down truth and accountability.' 

[From http://www.tutu.org.za. Accessed on 27 February 2016.]

The debt crisis in the 1980s gave Washington the opportunity to 'blast open' and fully  subordinate (suppress) Third World economies through World Bank and International  Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes. Starting in 1980, developing  countries were unable to pay back loans taken from Western commercial (profitable)  banks which had gone on a huge lending binge (spree) to Third World governments  during the mid to late 1970s when rising oil prices had filled up their coffers with petro-dollars.  
The World Bank and the IMF imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on  developing countries who needed to borrow money to service their debts. The World  Bank's SAPs were first instituted in 1980 which enforced privatisation of industries  (including necessities such as healthcare and water), cuts in government spending  and imposing (enforcing) user fees, liberalising of capital markets (which leads to  unstable trading in currencies), market-based pricing (which tends to raise the cost of  basic goods), higher interest rates and trade liberalisation. 
SAPs evolved (changed) to cover more and more areas of domestic policy, not only  fiscal, monetary and trade policy, but also labour laws, healthcare, environmental  regulations, civil service requirements, energy policy and government procurement. 
With the imposition of its own SAPs in 1986, the IMF became 'one of the most  influential institutions in the world'. Its 2 500 staff dictated the economic conditions of  life to over 1,4 billion people living in 75 developing countries. As one observer puts it,  'Never in history has an international agency exercised such authority.' 

[From http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/ImpoverishingAContinent.pdf. 
Accessed on 16 November 2015.]

Monte Leach:  One of the most controversial areas of involvement for the bank has  been its structural adjustment programmes. Some people argue they  hurt the poor by forcing governments to reduce or eliminate subsidies  for basic goods in exchange for getting World Bank loans. Is that  something that the bank is involved with? 

Ismail  Serageldin:  Sure. But let me backtrack (to explain the background) a bit. The bank  is a co-operative (co-worker) of member states. If I have a member  state who is in a deep mess, which is usually the case, they don't  come for structural adjustment on a pre-emptive (preventive) basis … 
If they're in bad shape, there really is very little that you can do at that  point in time except deal with the situation as it is. Sound advice up  front is not always acceptable to a lot of people because sometimes it's  unpleasant. 
I had these discussions with a number of African leaders in the 1980s  when I was working in Africa at the time. It's not a matter of ideology;  it's a matter of arithmetic (mathematics). You have expenditure and  you have income, and there's a gap between them. There are only  three ways of filling the gap. One is to print money, and that would lead  to hyperinflation, and we know what the results of that are. Incidentally,  the poor suffer the most from that because the elites usually manage  to dollarise (to make more expensive) their holdings. The second way  is to borrow. But most of these countries have borrowed to the point  where there is a debt crisis. They can't service their debts, and they  can't borrow any more by the time they come to us. And therefore the  third way that's possible is to reduce spending and increase revenues.  There is no fourth way in public finance to deal with this issue … 

Monte Leach:  Are you saying that structural adjustment programmes don't  necessarily have to be a bad thing, that it depends on how they're  implemented? 

Ismail Serageldin:  Exactly. There is a lot of difference in the manner in which you do  adjustments. 

[From http://www.shareintl.org/archives/economics/ec_mlview_wb.htm. 
Accessed on 15 November 2015.]

In 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a series of publications and  public statements claiming credit for an 'African economic renaissance' (revival) and 'a  turnaround in growth performance'. The claim from the IMF and World Bank is that  structural adjustment is beginning to pay off, at least in microeconomic terms. But  examining just-released growth projections by the World Bank, one discovers that the  'growth turnabout' has been short-lived. According to the World Bank, real gross  domestic product (GDP) per capita grew by 1,4% in 1996, but by 1997 growth slowed  to 0,4% and in 1998 per capita incomes fell by 0,8%. The World Bank projects a further  decline of 0,4% in 1999. In short, if there was an 'economic renaissance' for Africa it  appears to be over … 
The data reviewed in this study suggests that the IMF has failed in Africa, in terms of  its own stated objectives and according to its own data. Increasing debt burdens, poor  growth performance and the failure of the majority of the population to improve their  access to education, healthcare or other basic needs has been the general pattern in  countries subject to IMF programmes. 
The core elements of IMF structural adjustment programmes have remained  remarkably consistent since the early 1980s. Although there has been mounting  criticism and calls for reform over the last year and a half, no reforms of the IMF or its  policies have been forthcoming … 
In the absence of any reform at the IMF for the near future, the need for debt  cancellation for Africa is all the more urgent. The enormous debt burden consumed  4,3% of sub-Saharan Africa's gross national product (GNP) in 1997. If these resources  had been devoted to investment, the region could have increased its economic growth  by nearly a full percentage point – sadly this is more than twice its per capita growth for  that year. But the debt burden exacts another price, which may be even higher than  the drain of resources out of the country: it provides the means by which the IMF is  able to impose the conditions of its structural adjustment programmes on these  desperately poor countries.  

[From http://www.cerpr.net/documents/publications/debt 1999 04.htm. 
Accessed on 15 November 2015.]