In the aftermath (outcome) of World War II, Western Europe lay devastated. The war had  ruined crop fields and destroyed infrastructure, leaving most of Europe in dire (desperate)  need. On 5 June 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall announced the European  Recovery Programme. To avoid antagonising (provoking) the Soviet Union, Marshall  announced that the purpose of sending aid to Western Europe was completely  humanitarian, and even offered aid to the communist states in the East. Congress  approved Truman's request of 17 billion dollars over four years to be sent to Great Britain,  France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The Marshall Plan created an economic miracle in Western Europe. By the target date of  the programme four years later, Western European industries were producing twice as  much as they had the year before war broke out. Some Americans grumbled  (complained) about the costs, but the nation spent more on liquor during the years of the  Marshall Plan than they sent overseas to Europe. The aid also produced record levels of  trade with American firms, fuelling a post-war economic boom in the United States. 
Lastly, and much to Truman's delight, none of these nations of Western Europe faced a  serious threat of communist takeover for the duration of the Cold War. 

[From http://www.ushistory.org/us/52c.asp.
Accessed on 15 February 2016.]

Varga put forward an economic explanation, arguing that 'the economic situation in the  United States was the decisive (key) factor in putting forward the Marshall Plan proposal.  The Marshall Plan is intended in the first instance to serve as a means of softening the  expected economic crisis, the approach of which already no one in the United States  denies'. Varga then went on to outline the dimensions (lengths) of the economic crisis,  which he expected would soon overtake the United States. He anticipated a twenty  per cent drop in production during this crisis, leading to the creation of a ten-million-man  army of unemployed, and wreaking havoc (causing disaster) on the American banking  system. As to the political effects of these economic difficulties, he concluded that 'the  explosion of the economic and financial crisis will result in a significant drop in the foreign  policy prestige (status) of the United States, which hopes to play the role of stabiliser of  international capitalism'.  
The Marshall Plan, wrote Varga, represented an attempt to forestall (prevent) this crisis.  In his view, the United States found itself compelled (forced) to increase exports in order  to avoid the onset of a serious economic depression. To accomplish such an increase in  exports, the United States would grant credit to the European countries, even if they  could not repay them. Varga observed that this expedient (action) would prove especially  beneficial to 'monopoly capital'. He concluded:  
'Seen against this background, the idea behind the Marshall Plan is the following: If it is in  the interest of the United States itself to sell abroad American goods worth several  billion dollars on credit to bankrupt borrowers, then it is necessary to attempt to gain from  these credits the maximum political benefits.' 

[From https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf.
Accessed on 8 February 2016.] 

The economic consequences (results) of the Marshall Plan surpassed (were more than)  the most optimistic expectations of its authors. By 1952, the termination date of the  American aid programme, European industrial production had risen to 35 per cent and  agricultural production to 10 per cent above the pre-war level. From the depths of  economic despair the recipient nations of Western Europe embarked on a period of  economic expansion that was to bring a degree of prosperity to their populations  unimaginable (unbelievable) in the dark days of 1947.  
In the meantime the donor nation derived (received) great commercial benefits from its  financial largesse (assistance), as the Marxist-Leninist critics had forecast: more than  two-thirds of the European imports under the plan came from the United States, which  meant higher profits for American firms engaged in the export trade, as well as more jobs  for the workers they employed. It is doubtful that the phenomenal (outstanding) growth of the American economy in the prosperous era of the fifties and early sixties would have  occurred without the stimulus provided by orders for its goods and services from the other  nations of the industrial world across the Atlantic that were rebuilding their war-torn  economies. 

[From The Twentieth-Century World, An International History by WR Keylor]

From the point of view of the Soviet military, the Angolans, Cubans, the post-apartheid  South African government and many researchers, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the  turning point of the war, after which all the main goals of the war were achieved:  South Africa had to withdraw its troops, Angola achieved relative peace and Namibia its  independence. From the point of view of the South African military, there never was a 'Battle of Cuito Cuanavale', because, according to General J Geldenhuys, 'it had no  strategic significance whatsoever. It played no role at all from whatever angle you look at  it'. In fact, 'the Soviet alliance lost, because it did not manage to crush Savimbi and to  demolish his capital, Jamba …'. 
We shall leave this argument to military historians … But from a propaganda point of  view, it was a disaster … 
Russian researchers think that Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuban offensive in the  south-west (of Angola) changed the balance of power of forces in the region, creating a  favourable climate for the Angolan-Namibian settlement (New York Accords) ...  The truth is that, however many battles the South African Defence Force could claim to  have won on the battlefield, they lost the crucial political battle, and the war with it. 

[From The Hidden Thread. Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era by I Filatova and A Davidson]

The Angolan government had assigned us (Cuba) the responsibility of defending  Cuito Cuanavale, and all necessary measures were taken not only to stop the  South Africans, but to turn Cuito Cuanavale into a trap, a trap the South Africans ran into.  In Cuito Cuanavale the South African army really broke their teeth (lost its power) … 
The United States had been meeting with Angola for some time, presenting themselves  as mediators (negotiators) between the Angolans and the South Africans to seek a  peaceful solution, and so the years went by. But while these supposed negotiations were  taking place with the United States as intermediaries (negotiators), the South Africans had  intervened and tried to solve the Angolan situation militarily, and perhaps they would have  achieved it if it was not for the effort our country (Cuba) made. In fact the relationship  of forces changed radically. The South Africans suffered a crushing defeat in  Cuito Cuanavale and the worst part for them was still to come … 
There are moments when difficult and bitter decisions have to be taken, and when that  moment came, our party and our armed forces did not hesitate for an instant. I believe  that helped to prevent a political calamity (disaster), a military calamity for Angola, for  Africa and for all progressive forces. I believe that our actions (at Cuito Cuanavale)  decisively boosted the prospects for peace now present in the region. 

[From In Defence of Socialism: Four Speeches on the 30th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution by F Castro]

As Crocker (Assistant Secretary of African Affairs in the United States of America) had  successfully argued over months would be the case, the final agreement provided  something for each party involved … In the way the crisis was resolved, the two  superpowers worked more closely together than ever, especially in the Joint Monitoring  Commission that was established to ensure that the agreements were held to. 
This chapter is concerned with … why the crisis (at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988) was  resolved as it was and did not escalate (increase) into something far more serious. Key to  this was the coming into office of Gorbachev (1985) and the evolution (growth) of his 'new  thinking', which made possible new cooperation with the USA. It began to be possible for  all the parties to see that they could gain something by the settlement. Cuba and  South Africa both had to withdraw from Angola … They withdrew within the context of a  new relationship forged (made) between leading personalities involved in the  negotiations, and a new attitude towards the Soviet Union by the South Africans, who no  longer saw communism as a bogey (monster) and the USSR as out to conquer the  sub-continent … 
The superpowers played a critical role in the resolution of this crisis …

[From Cold War in Southern Africa. White Power and Black Liberation, edited by S Onslow]

… by the summer of 1957, school officials had selected 17 African-American students from over 200 applicants for enrolment at Central High School. School officials rejected  many applicants because their grades were not high enough. Others were rejected  because officials did not think they could handle the pressure of being a small minority in  a school that was overwhelmingly white … Still other African students dropped out on  their own after the superintendent told them that they would not be allowed to participate  in sports or any other extracurricular activity. As resistance to integration became more  vocal in the summer of 1957 in Little Rock and elsewhere, a number of parents withdrew  their children out of fear for their safety. 
By the time the school opened, only nine African-American students were prepared to  attend Central High School … Despite the talk on TV and the radio and the newspapers,  the 'Little Rock Nine' did not believe that integration would lead to violence in Little Rock.  The first indication that I had of it was the night before we were to go to school. 
Governor Faubus came on TV and indicated that he was calling out the (Arkansas)  National Guard to prevent our entrance into Central because of what he thought were  threats to our lives. He was doing it for our own 'protection'. Even at that time that was his  line. He said that the troops would be out in front of the school and they would block our  entrance to Central, for our protection as well as for the protection and tranquillity  (calmness) of the city. 

[From https://www.facinghistory.org/sites/default/files/publications/Choices_Little_Rock.pdf.
Accessed on 11 February 2016.]

The first scene Eckford saw when she got off the bus a block from Central High School  was a sea of angry faces. She tried to walk to the school, but a jeering (mocking) mob  blocked her path. All alone, her knees shaking, she pushed through the mob. She was  trying hard not to show her fright. 'It was the longest block I ever walked in my whole life,' she said later. Eckford was one of nine students who had volunteered to be among the  first African Americans to attend Central High School. When she left for school that  morning, Eckford thought there might be trouble. But she didn't know that she would see  hundreds of angry white people who had been waiting for her since early morning.  Suddenly a shout went through the crowd. Elizabeth Eckford was attempting to enter the  school. 
Eckford turned back to the National Guards, but they did nothing. She walked back to the  bus stop and sat down at the bench. Again, the mob surrounded her. 'Get a rope.  Drag her over to this tree! Let's take care of the nigger*.' A white woman fought her way  through the mob, screaming, 'Leave this child alone. Why are you tormenting (upsetting)  her? Six months from now, you will hang your heads in shame.' The woman, Grace Lorch,  sat down with Eckford on the bench. She put her arm around the girl and stayed there  until the bus arrived. 
Mrs Lorch rode with Eckford until she got off at the school where her mother taught. 

[From http://www.ahsd.org/social_studies/williamsm/The%20Mob%20at%20Central%20High%20School.pdf.
Accessed 20 February 2016.]

… The Nine gathered at the Bates home. It was the first time Elizabeth had ever met  Daisy Bates. Segregationists, reporters and Faubus were to accuse her of sending  Elizabeth into the mob deliberately, to garner (gather) sympathetic publicity. Now  Elizabeth let her have it, too. 'Why did you forget me?' she asked, with what Bates, who  died in 1999, later called 'cold hatred in her eyes'. To this day Elizabeth believes that  Bates, now lionised (praised) by everyone (a major street near Central High School has  been named after her), saw the black students as little more than foot soldiers in a cause,  and left them woefully unprepared for their ordeal. 
For two and a half weeks, as lawyers, judges and politicians wrangled (fought) over their  fate, the Little Rock Nine stayed home. Meantime, the image of Elizabeth and Hazel Bryan flashed around the world … Langston Hughes wrote in the Chicago Defender, this  'one lone little Negro girl' would matter more than all the other allegedly more important  players in the drama. The world press praised Elizabeth and condemned her attackers. 
Again a federal judge ordered Faubus to stop interfering and admit the black children.  Again a date was set: 23 September. Again, Daisy Bates notified the black families. By  now the Eckfords had gotten themselves a telephone, but Daisy dreaded a conversation  with them; how could she ask Elizabeth's mother to send her daughter back into the  mob? Bates kept moving them to the bottom of her list. Once more, though, Birdie  Eckford agreed to let Elizabeth go, and when the black children assembled at the Bates' home the next morning, she was among the first to arrive. 

[From http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/09/littlerock200709.
Accessed on 19 February 2016.]